

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

VERGIL'S ELEGIES

**ACTION** — **REVIEW** — **DISCUSSION** — **TEST** — **ANSWER**

1967-1971 JOURNAL OF LITERATURE 2673

• 100% Polyester • 100% Polyester • 100% Polyester • 100% Polyester •

DECA-SET II

Authority

By John NARE Date

Following is text of personal message from the President to  
de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan. Paris and Bonn should deliver  
soonest and discuss drawing on ~~marked~~ 939 as necessary. For  
info London message has been transmitted by White House wire to  
Macmillan. Bruce may make copy available Fonoff and/or offer discuss  
with Macmillan.

BEGIN TEXT

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 5:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove

Drafted by: EUR:WRT:tyler:rm  
11/19/62

**Telegraphic transmission as  
a method of communication**

E. Alexis Johnson

Geography

White House/Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Brubbeck

-SWIFT-

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COPY IS PROHIBITED  
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".**

~~SECRET~~

the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary to focus attention upon this Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the understanding. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called this week so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the Resolution of October 23rd, which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed force.

Meanwhile, we are considering further actions, which may involve response from the air to any attack on our surveillance, or a reimposition and extension of the sea oil quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of ending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, ~~SMC~~ since these are

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directly related to the operation of Soviet missiles.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, but the over-all situation is somewhat dimmed by the fact that we cannot do much about the missiles themselves. On the one hand, because Soviet missiles are no longer controlled by Castro, we have some leverage. On the other hand, on the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second blowback for Chairman Mao will be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ground combat units, with a total strength of perhaps 8,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12 to 16 thousand men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I expect to indicate clearly Tuesday that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards. Our precise choices among the

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numerous courses of action available to us will evidently be affected by what the Soviets and Cubans actually do.

In this general situation, I still believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem. END TEXT

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**


11/19/62

MESSAGE TO GENERAL DE GAULLE  
CHANCELLOR ADENAUER  
PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, I shall be able to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and I shall be able to concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by ✓ Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary for me to focus attention upon this



Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the ~~bargain~~. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called ~~for Friday~~ <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>understand?</sup> and that at that meeting we shall ask for a reaffirmation of the Resolution of October 23rd which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed forces. In effect, we shall be asking for renewed authorization <sup>new basis</sup> ~~for action~~ which may involve air attack on selected <sup>power & say about or an</sup> installations in Cuba, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, since these are directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ Soviet missiles are no longer <sup>under</sup> ~~pointed~~ ~~at us~~. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of

our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ~~air~~ <sup>ground combat</sup> ~~troops~~ units, with a total strength of perhaps 8,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12-16,000 men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I am not yet prepared to make precise choices among the numerous courses of action available to us, but I do expect to indicate clearly tomorrow that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards.

In this general situation while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem.

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

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MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

I think it is time for me to give you a full ~~but~~ account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively calm tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, and I shall be able to concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary for me to focus attention upon this important

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MS

INITIALED BY *[Signature]* DATE 5/19/68  
 DOWNGRADE BY *[Signature]*  DOWNGRADE IN PART  
 C. DADR  C. OADR  C. PDR  
 DOWNGRADE BY *[Signature]*  DOWNGRADE IN PART  
 C. DADR  C. OADR  C. PDR  
 DOWNGRADE BY *[Signature]*  DOWNGRADE IN PART  
 C. DADR  C. OADR  C. PDR

DRAFT  
11/19/62

MESSAGE TO GENERAL DE GAULLE

I am asking Ambassador Bohlen to bring this letter to you and to be prepared to respond to any further questions.

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DRAFT

11/19/62

Message to Chancellor Adenauer

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Soviet failure to [carry out their part of the bargain]. In that case I expect to announce that we are convening a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States for Wednesday, and that at that meeting we shall ask for a reaffirmation of the Resolution of October 23rd which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed forces. ~~We may also ask the Latin American states which still have political and economic relations with Cuba to break those relations.~~ In the wider sense, we shall be asking for renewed authorization for action which may involve air attack on selected installations in Cuba, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because the Soviet missiles are no longer pointed at us. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that the second backdown for Khrushchev may be somewhat harder in some ways than the first. We see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. On the other hand, the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are

considerably stronger than we earlier estimated... We have identified elements of four Soviet armored units, with a total strength of perhaps 8,000 men, and the total Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12-16,000 men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is likely while Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I am not yet prepared to make precise choices among the numerous courses of action available to us, but I do expect to indicate clearly tomorrow that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the continued and firm support which you and our other major allies have given. It may also be that in the process of generating pressure on the Cubans and the Russians, we may wish to proceed more slowly than we did in late October. We have time, after all, and the local balance of forces is increasingly favorable to us. In such a slower scenario, one course which may be helpful would be the reduction of all trading relations with Cuba by all non-bloc countries, and perhaps the prompt removal of all non-bloc shipping from the Cuba trade. These interim measures might make it possible to delay or avoid more drastic

[REDACTED]  
action, and it would be helpful to me to know your personal view  
on such a possibility.

DECEMBER 2011 CEC